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While a fast-growing body of research has looked at how the advent and diffusion of e-commerce
has affected prices, much less work has investigated e-commerce's impact on the number and type
of producers operating in an industry. This paper theoretically and empirically takes up the question
of which businesses most benefit and most suffer as consumers switch to purchasing products online.
We specify a general industry model involving consumers with differing search costs buying products
from heterogeneous-type producers. We interpret e-commerce as having reduced consumers' search
costs. We show how such reductions reallocate market shares from an industry's low-type producers
to its high-type businesses. We test the model using U.S. data for three industries in which e-commerce
has arguably decreased consumers' search costs considerably: travel agencies, bookstores, and new
auto dealers. Each industry exhibits the market share shifts predicted by the model. Interestingly, while
the industries experienced similar changes, the specific mechanisms through which e-commerce induced
them differed. For bookstores and auto dealers, industry-wide declines in small outlets reflected market-specific
impacts, evidenced by the fact that more small-store exit occurred in local markets where consumers'
use of e-commerce channels grew fastest. For travel agencies, on the other hand, the shifts reflected
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This paper explores how the advent and diﬀusion of e-commerce impacts the structure
of retail and similar industries. While there is a burgeoning literature studying how e-
commerce has aﬀected prices and price dispersion (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000);
Clay, Krishnan, and Wolﬀ (2001); Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001); Brown
and Goolsbee (2002); and Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004)), much less work has looked
at how the diﬀusion of the internet has inﬂuenced the number or type of producers that
operate in an industry. That is, questions of which businesses most beneﬁt and most suﬀer
(perhaps to the point of having to cease operations) from the new consumer-matching and
distribution systems that e-commerce brings have received little attention. Conventional
wisdom suggests that such eﬀects can be large and diverse in impact; the rapid growth
of Orbitz, Travelocity, and Expedia at the expense of local travel agencies is one oft-cited
example. Yet we do not yet know quantitatively just how large this particular eﬀect has
been or whether similar mechanisms operate across diﬀerent industries. This paper seeks
to begin to address these issues.
It is almost certain that more than just equilibrium prices are aﬀected when e-commerce
spreads in an industry. Market shares are very likely to change; given the reduction in con-
sumer search costs that e-commerce can bring, any ﬁrm’s price advantage will be multiplied
in terms of market-share gains. Higher cross-price elasticities imply diﬀerential impacts on
industry ﬁrms depending on whether they have a cost advantage or disadvantage relative
to their competitors. It is also quite likely that these market share changes can be drastic
enough to lead some ﬁrms to exit from the market entirely. On the other hand, lower search
costs could also induce new entry into the industry. Presumably, though, these entrants
may diﬀer on average from industry incumbents because e-commerce has raised the return
to being eﬃcient (or, alternatively, to being able to produce high-quality goods). In such
ways, e-commerce can have important entry and exit consequences as well.
Our investigative approach combines theoretical and empirical analyses. We ﬁrst model
equilibrium in an industry comprised of heterogeneous ﬁrms selling to a set of consumers
who diﬀer in their search costs. Heterogeneity across ﬁrms arise from diﬀerences in un-
derlying abilities like production costs or output quality. We embody them as diﬀering
marginal costs for the sake of concreteness, though it is easy to modify the model to allow
variation in product quality levels instead. Industry consumers search sequentially when
deciding from whom to buy. Firms set prices given consumers’ optimal search behavior as
1well as their own and their rivals’ production costs. Firms that cannot cover their ﬁxed
costs exit the industry. Initial entry into the industry is governed by an entry cost.
We interpret the advent and diﬀusion of e-commerce as a leftward shift in the consumer
search cost distribution. We use our model to show how e-commerce activity impacts
equilibrium market structure. The model oﬀers predictions about not just equilibrium
prices but also market shares, the number of producers, and the producer type (marginal
cost) distribution.
The model predicts, as the previous literature has focused on, a decline in equilibrium
average price levels and price dispersion. The more novel implications of our work, however,
regard what happens to the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm types. Here the model predicts
that the introduction of e-commerce into an industry should result in the shrinking and
sometimes exit of low-type (i.e., high-cost) ﬁrms, a shift in market share to high-type (low-
cost) ﬁrms, and with some additional assumptions about the ﬁrm type and consumer search
cost distributions, a drop in the number of producers as well.
We test the model using U.S. County Business Patterns (CBP) data from 1994-2003.
CBP data contain, at the detailed industry level, the total number of establishments (stores)
as well as their size distribution. While we cannot measure producer types directly, we can
use size as a proxy; hence shifts in the size distribution are informative about heterogeneous
eﬀects of e-commerce within an industry. The panel nature of the data allows us to focus on
changes in the distribution over time within local markets, removing possibly confounding
diﬀerences in technology or demand across markets. We identify local diﬀerences in the
impact of e-commerce (i.e., the size of the shift in the local search cost distribution) using
consumer-level survey data to measure the fraction of the local population who report
buying goods and services online.
We focus the empirical tests on three industries perceived to have been considerably
impacted by e-commerce: travel agencies, bookstores, and new auto dealers. We ﬁnd sup-
port for the predictions of the theoretical model. Growth in consumers’ use of Internet for
purchases is linked to declines in the number of small (and presumably low-type) estab-
lishments, but has either no signiﬁcant impact or even positive impact on growth in the
industries’ numbers of large establishments. Interestingly, while the industries experience
similar patterns in market share shifts, the speciﬁc mechanisms linking declining search
costs to the shifts diﬀered across the industries. The shifts in the travel agency industry re-
ﬂected aggregate changes driven largely by airlines cutting agent commissions as consumers
increasingly shifted to online ticket sources. In bookstores and new car dealers, on the other
2hand, the evidence suggests that the decline in small retail outlets reﬂect market-speciﬁc
impacts of Internet diﬀusion.
We present the general industry model in the next section and explore its predictions for
how shifts in search costs impact equilibrium in an industry with heterogeneous producers.
The third section discusses the data used in the empirical analysis. This is followed by a
presentation and discussion of the empirical results. A short discussion concludes.
2 Model
Our model combines elements of two distinct theoretical literatures. One is the set of
search models with consumers that have heterogeneous search costs. Examples include
Carlson and McAfee (1983), Rob (1985), Benabou (1993), and Horta¸ csu and Syverson
(2004). Our conceptual approach of treating the diﬀusion of e-commerce technologies
as shifting consumers’ search costs (perhaps disparately for diﬀerent consumers) is the
obvious motivation for drawing on this previous work. The second literature involves
industry equilibrium models that feature heterogenous producers and endogenous selection
into production, like Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003), Syverson (2004), and Asplund and
Nocke (2006). Endogenizing the set of equilibrium producers is important to meet our
goal of assessing how e-commerce might diﬀerentially impact industry producers by type,
including determining which types enter and exit when search costs change.
2.1 Setup
There is a continuum of ﬁrms selling a homogeneous good for consumption by a continuum
of consumers. All consumers have perfectly inelastic unit demand for the good being sold,
but are heterogeneous in their search costs s ∈ R+. The total mass of consumers is ﬁxed
and normalized to one. The probability distribution of consumer search costs is given by
cdf Q having a continuously diﬀerentiable pdf q. It is assumed that 0 is the greatest lower
bound of the support of q and that Q(0) = q(0) = 0. Like in Benabou (1993), ﬁrms
are also heterogeneous, diﬀering in their marginal costs of production c ∈ R+, which are
their private information. The total mass of all operating ﬁrms is L. Unlike Benabou, we
let the mass of ﬁrms be determined endogenously, through an zero-proﬁt condition (see
Section 2.4).
The timing of decisions by ﬁrms and consumers is as follows. At the beginning of the
3period, potential ﬁrms consider entering the industry. If a ﬁrm decides to enter, it pays
the sunk cost of entry, κ and learns its own marginal cost c, which is drawn i.i.d. from a
publicly known probability distribution with cdf Γ and pdf γ, whose support lies in [0,1].
Next, ﬁrms decide whether to stay in the industry or not. Those that choose to stay then
decide how much to charge and produce. Production requires a ﬁxed cost of operation ν ,
which is identical in all ﬁrms. This cost can be avoided if the ﬁrm chooses to stay out of
the market.1
2.2 Consumers’ Problem
We make the standard assumption that consumers know the price distribution, F(p) (with
density f(p)), but must engage in costly search to learn the price charged by any particular
ﬁrm. Consumers’ search is undirected and sequential; they visit a store to learn its price
and then compare after every visit the beneﬁt and cost of continued search. If the expected
price reduction from visiting another store is greater than the marginal (search) cost s, the
consumer continues to search; otherwise, she buys the product at the lowest price in hand.
Thus, as in McCall (1970), the optimal stopping rule is characterized by a reservation
price where a consumer continues to search as long as she ﬁnds a price greater than some




(ρ(s) − p)f(p)dp. (1)
As seen in the equation, the reservation price is such that, if the price in hand is ρ(s), the
marginal cost of search s equals the expected beneﬁt from continuing search. (The integral
on the right-hand side is the expected reduction in price from another search, accounting
for the option value of discarding higher price draws.) It also implies that a consumer
with zero search cost always buys from the ﬁrm with the lowest price. We convert this
optimality condition into an equivalent but slightly less intuitive form (albeit easier to work





1We could have eliminated the ﬁxed cost of operation from the model, but in that case, those ﬁrms that
otherwise exit the market would stay in the market by charging prices equal to their marginal costs. Thus
having a ﬁxed cost in the model leads to the sensible implication that only ﬁrms that make positive proﬁts
stay in the market.
4Diﬀerentiating this with respect to s yields 1 = F(ρ(s))ρ′(s), which shows that ρ(s) is







We assume that ﬁrms do not know the marginal costs and hence the prices set by their
rivals, but instead know the marginal-cost distribution Γ. Further, ﬁrms do not know the
search cost of any individual consumer, but do know the distribution Q of search costs.
Taking as given the distributions of search costs and marginal costs, each ﬁrm determines
its optimal price based on the demand it faces, characterized by the reservation price rule
ρ(s) implied by (1).
Let us now consider the optimization program of a ﬁrm with marginal cost draw c
that chooses to stay in the industry. We ﬁrst determine market share as a function of the
price p charged by the ﬁrm: x(p).2 The optimal search rule implies that only consumers
with reservation prices ρ(s) above p will buy from the ﬁrm. Take one such consumer with
reservation price r. Recalling that the price distribution in the market is given by the cdf F
and that the total mass of operating ﬁrms is L, the mass of ﬁrms charging a price less than
r is LF(r). The assumption of undirected search implies that this particular consumer is
equally likely to buy from any one of these ﬁrms. That is, the probability that she will buy
from a particular ﬁrm charging price p is 1/(LF(r)). Integrating over all such potential























2We use the market share interchangeably with the price because there is no outside good, each consumer
demands one unit of the good, and the total mass of consumers equals one.
5We use the reservation price distribution to simplify the integral for market share. Inserting












This equation is a standard (residual) demand curve: a ﬁrm faces demand determined
by its own price as well as its competitors’ prices. Here, these prices are embodied in the











The proﬁt function of a ﬁrm with marginal cost c choosing to stay in the industry can
be expressed as the solution to the ﬁrm’s optimization program:
π(c) = max
p (p − c)x(p) − ν. (7)
The values of p that maximize this equation for given values of c will deﬁne the equilibrium
pricing function p(c). The ﬁrst-order condition for an optimum requires that, for all c,
(p(c) − c)x
′(p(c)) + x(p(c)) = 0, (8)
while the second-order condition for a maximum at this point stipulates that
(p(c) − c)x
′′(p(c)) + 2x
′(p(c)) < 0. (9)
2.4 Industry Equilibrium
Let p(·) and x(·) be, respectively, the pricing and residual demand functions in equilib-
rium. Note that this implies that p(·) is optimal for each ﬁrm, given x(·), and therefore
the ﬁrst and second order conditions for individual optimality, (8) and (9), must hold at
each point. The downward-sloping demand then yields three important properties of the
industry equilibrium.
Property 1. The equilibrium pricing function p(c) is increasing with marginal cost: p′(c) >
0 (∀c).




(p(c) − c)x′′(p(c)) + 2x′(p(c))
> 0,
since demand slopes downward and the denominator is negative by the second-order con-
dition.










by downward-sloping demand and Property 1.
Property 3. The proﬁt function is decreasing with marginal cost: π′(c) < 0 (∀c).
Proof. Applying the Envelope Theorem to (7) yields π′(c) = −x(p(c)) < 0.
Note that Property 3 implies that the ﬁrms’ decision rule for staying in the industry
or leaving is characterized by a cutoﬀ value: there exists a threshold ¯ c > 0 such that ﬁrms
stay in the industry if and only if their marginal cost is c ≤ ¯ c (we assume here that the exit
decision is non-trivial, i.e., some ﬁrms do exit and some produce). The threshold value is
given by
0 = π(¯ c) = (p(¯ c) − ¯ c)x(p(¯ c)) − ν (10)
The initial stage involves ex-ante identical potential entrants deciding whether or not
to commence operations. We assume that there is unlimited entry into the industry: ﬁrms








(p(c) − c)x(p(c))γ(c)dc − Γ(¯ c)ν. (11)
Note that this entry condition implies ex-ante zero proﬁts and ex-post positive proﬁts.
Finally, note that Property 1 implies that prices will be distributed with support [p, ¯ p],
where p = p(0) and ¯ p = p(¯ c), with the cdf (for q ∈ [p, ¯ p]) given by
F(q) = Pr{p(c) ≤ q|π(c) ≥ 0} =
Pr{c ≤ p−1(q)&c ≤ ¯ c}





Note that F(q) = 0 for q < p and F(q) = 1 for q > ¯ p. We are now ready to deﬁne the
equilibrium in this industry.
Deﬁnition 1. A search equilibrium is a set {ρ : R+ → R+,p : R+ → R+,x : R+ →
R+,F : R+ → [0,1],¯ c > 0} satisfying equations (2), (6), (8), (10), (11), and (12), along
with inequality (9).
73 Comparative Statics
Our goal is to determine the eﬀect of a decrease in search costs on the search equilibrium.
In particular, we are interested in how shifts in search costs aﬀect the equilibrium price
distribution F, the operating cutoﬀ cost ¯ c and the total mass of ﬁrms L. To this end,
consider a family of search cost distributions Q(·|t), where higher t corresponds to higher
search costs in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).3
First, let us consider the function p(c,F,t), which gives the best-response price for a
ﬁrm with marginal cost c when the price distribution of all operating ﬁrms is F and the
search costs are Q(·|t). Examining the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition and applying the MLRP
condition, we obtain our ﬁrst comparative statics result.
Proposition 1. The best-response pricing function p(c,F,t) is increasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
Thus, the optimal price charged by each ﬁrm is increasing in the search costs, holding
ﬁxed other ﬁrms’ pricing and entry/exit decisions (which aﬀect F). However, this by itself
does not guarantee that the equilibrium prices will increase with search costs. Therefore,
we must look for conditions on the search cost distribution that will guarantee that the
equilibria will move in the same direction as the individual response functions. To this end,
we must ﬁrst make precise the notion of increasing price distributions. Following Rauh
(2008), we adopt the following partial order ≥ on the set of distribution functions with
support in (0,∞): F ≥ F ′ iﬀ F ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F ′ (i.e., F(p) ≤ F ′(p)
for all p > 0). We now ask for conditions on q that will guarantee that the equilibrium
distribution F will be increasing in t (with respect to the partial order ≥).
As explained in Appendix 7.1, a natural suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium distri-
bution to be increasing in search costs is that the market be supermodular in the sense
of Rauh (2008). Verifying this condition is not trivial in our model, however, since our
setting diﬀers substantially from Rauh’s model due to the endogenous entry/exit decisions
of ﬁrms. Therefore, for the rest of our analysis, we will restrict our attention to the case
when the search cost distribution is uniform, where we can characterize equilibria explicitly.
Although we are able to obtain exact results only in the uniform search cost case, numerical
simulations show that the comparative statics under other search cost distributions (such
3That is, for each s1 > s0, the ratio q(s1 |t)/q(s0 |t) is increasing in t.
8as the exponential distribution) tend to be very similar to those obtained under the uniform
distribution (see Appendix 7.4).
3.1 Uniform Search Costs
Following the discussion in Appendix 7.1, we focus on uniform search cost distributions:
Assumption 1. The search cost distribution is uniform on [0,a] for a > 0.
With this formulation, a decrease in search costs can be identiﬁed with a decrease
in the parameter a. The marginal cost distribution, on the other hand, is allowed to
take a very general form, subject only to the weak condition of log-concave cdf, which
is satisﬁed by most commonly used distributions (such as uniform, normal, lognormal,
gamma, exponential, Pareto, and others, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)):
Assumption 2. The cdf of the marginal cost distribution is log-concave, i.e., γ(c)/Γ(c) is
decreasing in c for all c.
















(ρ(a) − p). (13)
The second equality follows, because ρ is increasing. The ﬁnal equality holds, because it
is not optimal for any ﬁrm to charge less than ρ(0), so that p > ρ(0). Note that x′(p) =
−1/(aL) < 0 and x′′(p) = 0, so that the second-order condition (9) holds. Plugging (13)




(ρ(a) + c), (14)










and the operating threshold equation (10) yields
¯ c = ρ(a) − 2
√
aLν. (17)
The upper and lower limits of the support of the equilibrium price distribution are therefore
p = p(0) = ρ(a)/2 and ¯ p = p(¯ c) = ρ −
√
aLν.
9We now see that a search equilibrium is fully determined by two parameters, ¯ ρ ≡
ρ(a) > 0 and L, satisfying equations (2) (for s = a), (11), (12), and (14) through (17).
Plugging (14) and (12) into (2) for s = a yields
a =
1

























Finally, we insert equations (14) through (17) into the entry condition (11), reducing the
conditions for a search equilibrium to the following system of two equations in ¯ ρ and L:
Ψ(¯ ρ,L;a) ≡
1

















(¯ ρ − c)
2γ(c)dc − Γ(¯ ρ − 2
√
aLν)ν = κ. (19)
Manipulating the ﬁrst equation (details in Appendix 7.2) shows that either the mass of
ﬁrms or the reservation threshold of the consumer with the highest search costs (or both)
must increase as the search cost distribution shifts right.







The proof, which is provided in Appendix 7.2, amounts to showing that if both L and ¯ ρ
were non-increasing in a, the left-hand side of (18) would be decreasing in a, which would
violate that identity. The logic of this result is straightforward: a decrease in search costs
(a), if not accompanied by a decrease in search opportunities (higher L), will result in
increased marginal beneﬁt of continued search, which will cause searchers to become more
selective, thus decreasing ¯ ρ.
In a similar manner, equation (19) implies that if the mass of ﬁrms decreases as the
search cost distribution shifts left, the reservation threshold of the consumer with the
highest search costs must also decrease.







10The proof, shown in Appendix 7.2, consists of demonstrating that the contrary state-
ment would cause the left-hand side of (19) to be decreasing in a, violating that identity.
Whereas Lemma 1 relied on the consumer side, Lemma 2 relies on the producer side: the
intuition is that an increase in competition (higher L) must be accompanied by a compen-
sating increase in searchers’ reservation prices (thus increasing ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts per
transaction) in order for average proﬁts to stay constant.




Together with the pricing equation (14) this gives us our ﬁrst key result:
Proposition 2. When search costs decrease, the price p(c) charged by a ﬁrm with marginal
cost c decreases for any operating ﬁrm.
Our next objective is to determine the eﬀect of a change in a on the operating cutoﬀ






where we write L(a) to emphasize its dependence on a. Note that this can be interpreted as
the per-ﬁrm density of consumers with a given level of search costs, since the total number
of ﬁrms is L(a) and the density of consumers with any level of search cost s is simply 1/a.
It is easy to see that δ(a) is decreasing in a:
Lemma 3. The per-ﬁrm density of consumers with any given level of search costs is de-
creasing in a: δ′(a) < 0.
The proof of this result is straightforward (see Appendix 7.2): since ¯ ρ is increasing with
a, δ needs to decrease with a in order to preserve equality in (19).








δ(a)(¯ ρ(a) − c)
2, (20)
where we have written L(a) and ¯ ρ(a) to emphasize the dependence of these parameters on
a. Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to a and applying Lemma 3 (details
in Appendix 7.2), we can now easily make our next observation: if an increase of search
costs hurts any currently operating ﬁrm, it must also hurt all ﬁrms with lower search costs:
11Lemma 4. If there exists c0 ≤ ¯ c(a) such that πa(c0;a) ≤ 0, then πa(c;a) < 0 for all c < c0.
The intuition for this result is again quite simple. The only negative eﬀect on a ﬁrm of
increasing a and thus increasing ¯ ρ(a) is that the ﬁrm now has to share its current customer
base with more higher-cost ﬁrms. This eﬀect becomes larger and larger, as the marginal cost
of the ﬁrm decreases. (Note, for example, that the ﬁrm with marginal cost ¯ c(a) was already
sharing all of its consumers with all operating ﬁrms, so that the only additional sharing
comes from the additional ﬁrms that were not operating before, whereas the zero-cost ﬁrm
now needs to share each of its customers with more of the ﬁrms that were operating before.)
It now becomes clear that the proﬁt of the ﬁrm at the current marginal cost cutoﬀ
level ¯ c(a) must decrease as search costs decrease. If this were not the case, the proﬁts of
all currently operating ﬁrms would increase, which would result in an overall increase of
ex-ante expected proﬁts. This would violate the entry condition (19), which states that the
ex-ante expected proﬁts must remain constant at κ. Since the proﬁt function (for each a)
is strictly decreasing in c, the fact that the proﬁt of the current cutoﬀ-level ﬁrm falls below
the operating threshold ν implies that the new cutoﬀ level will be lower than the current
level. Formalizing these arguments (Appendix 7.2), we obtain our second key result:
Proposition 3. When search costs decrease, so does the operating-cutoﬀ marginal cost, ¯ c.
Proposition 3 has the immediate empirically testable implication that some of the ﬁrms
with the highest marginal costs of production will exit the industry in response to a decrease
in consumers’ search costs.
Propositions 2 and 3 together yield two more testable implications: both the prices
charged in equilibrium and the marginal costs of operating ﬁrms will decrease, as search
costs decrease (formal details in Appendix 7.2):
Corollary 1. When search costs decrease, the distributions of equilibrium prices and mar-
ginal costs of operating ﬁrms shift to the left in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
Thus, search cost decreases lead to increased eﬃciency of operating ﬁrms and to lower
prices for consumers. As Proposition 3 shows, this increased eﬃciency is due to the fact that
the lowering of consumer search costs diminishes the proﬁts of ineﬃcient (high-marginal
cost) ﬁrms, causing some of these ﬁrms to exit the industry. It is easy to see, however, that
the more eﬃcient ﬁrms will actually beneﬁt from a search cost reduction. If a decrease in
¯ c (and thus a reduced likelihood of staying in the market) were accompanied by decreased
proﬁts of all operating ﬁrms, the ex-ante expected proﬁts would decrease, violating the
entry condition that says that those are constant and equal to the cost of entry.
12Corollary 2. A decrease in search costs causes the proﬁts of ﬁrms with suﬃciently low
marginal costs to increase: for each a, there exists ˆ c(a) < ¯ c(a) such that πa(c;a) < 0 for all
c < ˆ c(a).
Similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that the total market share of low-cost ﬁrms
should increase in response to decreasing consumer search costs, as the share of high-cost
ﬁrms decreases. To state this formally, let us denote the total market share of all ﬁrms
with marginal cost in (c,c + dc) (for inﬁnitesimal dc) by X(c;a)dc. Then, for each c,
X(c,a)dc = Lx(c;a)γ(c)dc.
Applying similar arguments to those we used for determining the change in proﬁts, we can
readily obtain the following result (see Appendix 7.2 for details):
Corollary 3. A decrease in search costs causes the total market share of all ﬁrms with
suﬃciently low marginal costs to increase: for each a, there exists ˆ c(a) < ¯ c(a) such that
Xa(c;a) < 0 for all c < ˆ c(a).
The results of Proposition 3 and Corollaries 2 and 3 establish the main empirical hy-
pothesis of our model: search cost declines driven by the advent and diﬀusion of e-commerce
have diﬀering eﬀects across businesses in an industry. Low-type (high-cost) sellers are hurt,
sometimes to the point of being forced to exit. Higher types (low-cost sellers), however,
actually gain from the shift: the market share of low-cost ﬁrms grows, resulting in increas-
ing concentration of the market. Finally, it appears to be impossible to sign the change
in the total mass of ﬁrms analytically (see Appendix 7.3), but numerical simulations with
a variety of marginal cost distributions suggest that the mass of ﬁrms may decrease when
search costs decrease (Appendix 7.4).
4 Data
Our empirical analysis uses data from two primary sources: industry employment and
establishment counts from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP),
and U.S. consumers’ online purchasing behavior from Forrester Research Technographics
surveys. We brieﬂy describe these data sets here, as well as discuss our market deﬁnition.
134.1 County Business Patterns
Annual County Business Patterns data contain, by detailed industry, the number of es-
tablishments in each U.S. county. Establishments are unique geographic locations where
economic activity takes place (i.e., oﬃces in the travel agency industry, storefronts in the
bookstore industry, and car lots in the auto dealerships industry). A ﬁrm can own one or
more establishments.4 Both the total number of establishments and establishment counts
by employment range are included in the data.5 In cases where disclosure of conﬁdential
information is not an issue, total industry employment and payroll in the county are also re-
ported. However, these are often missing in the industries we study, particularly in smaller
counties served by only a handful of ﬁrms. We can, however, impute total employment by
multiplying the establishment counts in an employment range category by an estimate of
the average number of employees per establishment in the category. We use the simple av-
erage of the categories’ endpoints for this estimate. While imputations invariably introduce
measurement error, we are reassured by the fact that the correlation between imputed and
actual reported employment for those counties where the latter is available is quite high.
Further, most of the empirical work below focuses on establishment counts, which we never
have to impute.
We use data spanning 1994 to 2003, which surrounds the period when the advent of
browser software began the internet’s diﬀusion into the broader population. It is also the
time span over for which CBP data are available with the level of industry detail necessary
for our purposes here. We focus on three industries: travel agencies (SIC 4724/NAICS
561510), bookstores (SIC 5942, NAICS 451211), and new auto dealers (SIC 5510/NAICS
441110). While a major change in the industry classiﬁcation scheme occurred in 1997 (from
the SIC system to the NAICS taxonomy), these industries’ boundaries remained unaﬀected,
so values before and after the change are comparable.
4While it would be very interesting to study the issues at hand in the context of within- and across-ﬁrm
shifts, there is unfortunately no way to identify ﬁrms in the CBP data. “Firms” in the model above can be
interpreted here as distinct operations (oﬃces, storefronts, or lots) in an industry. While it is possible that
common ownership may aﬀect individual establishments’ reactions to the shift to e-commerce, we think
that the model’s basic implications about the relative impacts on low- versus high-type producers remain
to a large extent even within multiple-establishment ﬁrms. For example, all else equal, a ﬁrm seeking to
reduce its size will tend to close its low-type operations ﬁrst.
5The reported ranges are: 1-4 employees, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, and over
1000 employees. Since very large establishments are relatively uncommon in the industries we study here,
we aggregate the largest categories into a single category.
144.2 Household Internet Use
The data on households’ e-commerce activity comes from Forrester Research, a market re-
search company with a program focusing on consumers’ technology use. Its annual Techno-
graphics survey is designed to be nationally representative and includes the responses of
roughly 55,000 people living in the continental U.S.6
We have access to the 2003 and 2004 surveys. Survey responses reﬂect behavior in the
year previous to the title year, because the survey is typically administered from prior-year
December through title-year January. For example, when the 2004 survey asks respondents
about their behavior over the past year, the answers reﬂect actions taken in 2003.
While the survey is primarily cross-sectional, conveniently for us there is a retrospective
question asking when the respondent “start[ed] purchasing products or services online.”
The respondent can choose one of several time ranges: “less than 1 year ago,” “1 year
to less than 2 years ago,” and so on up to “8 years ago or more.” We construct from
these responses the fraction of market consumers that had started purchasing products or
services online for each year from 1994 through 2003.7
4.3 Market Deﬁnition
We deﬁne markets using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Component Economic
Areas (CEAs). CEAs are collections of counties usually, but not always, centered on
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Counties are selected for inclusion in a given
CEA based upon their MSA status, commuting ﬂows, and newspaper circulation patterns,
subject to the condition that CEAs counties are contiguous. CEA boundaries need not
coincide with state boundaries. The selection criteria ensure that counties in a given CEA
6See Goolsbee (2000) for additional details about the survey.
7We used the 2003 survey to compute the fraction of online shoppers in 1994 and 1995, and the 2004
survey to compute the fractions from 1996 to 2003. The use of two surveys was necessary because the
“8 years ago or more” responses in the 2004 survey correspond to any purchases occurring before 1996,
not necessarily those in 1995 exclusively. We do see 1995 purchase patterns, however, in the 2003 survey
(through the “7 years to less than 8 years ago” responses). We are still left with online activity in 1994 being
measured with “8 years ago or more” responses from the earlier survey. However, given the small fractions
of respondents reporting buying products online in 1995 (see below), as well as the fact that the internet’s
commercial structure at that time was quite embryonic, it is unlikely that many of the purchases attributed
to 1994 actually occurred before that year. The use of two separate surveys over the observation period
does not seem to have created spurious increases in reported online purchases. There is no discernable
trend break between 1995 and 1996, the surveys’ point of contact.
15are economically intertwined. The roughly 3200 U.S. counties are grouped this way into
348 markets that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the land mass of the United
States. Since our internet use data excludes Alaska and Hawaii, our empirical analysis uses
data for the 345 CEAs in the continental U.S.8
Using CEAs oﬀers a compromise between conﬂicting requirements of the analysis. The
most constraining is that, with an internet use sample of 55,000, using smaller market
areas (like counties) would result in many markets having very thin samples. We use the
county indicator in the Technographics survey to aggregate the respondents to the CEA
level. This reduces the sampling error involved, though of course with the tradeoﬀ of losing
some variation in market structures. Further, counties may in some cases be too small to
accurately capture market areas in the industries we investigate. This is especially true
in more rural areas, where cross-county commerce in travel agency, book sales, and auto
purchases is likely to be commonplace. CEAs should be large enough to envelop businesses’
catchment areas in most cases.9
To give an idea of the size of markets in our data, Table 1 presents summary statistics
of within-CEA establishment counts in our industries. In order to highlight across-market
diﬀerences, we ﬁrst take the within-market average establishment counts over our sample
period, and then report quantiles of the cross-sectional distribution of these averages. The
table shows quantiles for the total number of establishments as well as for each of the
employment size categories. We note, however, that our empirical speciﬁcations below
include market ﬁxed eﬀects, so that the estimated relationships between market structure
and consumers’ online shopping behavior reﬂect within-market variation over time.
5 Empirical Tests
We seek to test the model’s implications regarding how a shift in the consumer search cost
distribution impacts industry market structure, particularly with regard to the relative
fortunes of high- and low-type businesses. Our focus, as mentioned previously, is on indus-
tries where a shift in consumer activity to e-commerce channels has been cited as having
a noted impact on industry businesses. While these industries are in many ways suitable
8See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1995) for more detailed information about creation of CEAs
and the super-regions that they comprise, Economic Areas.
9Since our consumer e-commerce use measure is built from responses of a ﬁxed set of consumers to a
retrospective question, we must also assume that any across-CEA population movements over our sample
period are unrelated to local growth in e-commerce infrastructure.
16for our analysis, they are not perfect matches to the stylized industry in the model. We
do ﬁnd it entirely plausible, as the model assumes, that there are signiﬁcant and persistent
diﬀerences in producers’ types in these industries. The most relevant type dimension in
these industries is, it seems to us, the per-dollar cost to industry businesses of delivering a
bundle of goods and services at a given quality level.
An important dimension where reality and the model depart, however, is with respect to
horizontal product diﬀerentiation. We do not model this above, but it almost surely exists
to some extent in each industry we study. Horizontal product diﬀerentiation may dampen
the quantitative impact of the substitutability-enhancing (via reduced search cost) features
of e-commerce. (Researchers have noted eﬀorts along these lines among booksellers; see
Clay et al. (2002), for example.) To the extent that any changes did occur, our estimates
oﬀer guidance as to the magnitude of e-commerce’s impact net of product diﬀerentiation
shifts.
Another potential point of departure between our model and our analysis is that in two
of the industries, travel agencies and bookstores, the diﬀusion of the Internet has allowed
the entry of online-only retailers. As in Latcovich and Smith (2001), these businesses have
diﬀerent cost structures than traditional “brick-and-mortar” retailers, in that they may
have higher ﬁxed costs, but lower marginal costs. Moreover, such Internet only retailers
arguably provide a diﬀerent bundle of goods/services, in that customers cannot inspect the
good ﬁrst-hand and must wait for it to be shipped. By assuming uniform ﬁxed costs and
homogenous products, our model does not explicitly account for the creation of Internet-
only retailers, focusing rather on how brick-and-mortar retailer demand might change in
response to a reduction in consumer search costs brought about by the Internet. An
advantage of investigating new car dealers, however, is that regulations prevent similar
“online-only”entrants in this industry, making it a close match to our theoretical model.
Yet another dimension we do not model is the endogeneity of certain ﬁxed costs, such as
advertising, which can lead to industry dominance patterns as in Sutton (1991). Latcovich
and Smith (2001) document high level of advertising expenditure among online booksellers.
If consumers are not fully informed about the quality of their retail service, and if adver-
tising can signal vertical characteristics such as reliability, security, and ease of use, ﬁrms
advertise heavily to increase consumers’ willingness to pay. Just as with search costs, hori-
zontal or vertical diﬀerentiation decreases consumers’ abilities to substitute across industry
producers.
175.1 Travel Agencies
Much has been made of the demise of the travel agent as consumers shifted their travel
purchases to e-commerce sites like travel search engines (e.g., Orbitz or Expedia) or to travel
service providers themselves (especially by buying tickets directly from airlines’ websites).
Aggregate statistics leave little doubt that the diﬀusion of the internet coincided with
considerable establishment exit in the travel agency industry. Figure 3 plots two time
series: the total number of industry establishments, and the fraction of Technographics
survey respondents reporting that they had ﬁrst purchased products or services online by a
given year. The number of travel agency establishments was fairly steady, slightly rising in
fact, until 1997, at which time it began to fall substantially. The number of establishments
in the industry dropped by over 35 percent between 1997 and 2003. As can be seen, this
exit coincided with a post-1997 acceleration in the fraction of surveyed consumers reporting
online purchases.
This broad exit pattern was concentrated among the industry’s smaller operations.
Panel A of Table 2 contains establishment counts by establishment size category (size is
measured by number of employees).10 Over the sample period, establishment counts fell
in the four smallest employment categories, those including businesses with fewer than
50 employees. The drop was especially precipitous among establishments with less than
10 employees. At the same time, though, the number of establishments with 50 or more
employees actually rose. The number of operations with 100 or more employees grew 70
percent. The vicious shakeout at the low end was therefore accompanied by growth among
the largest industry businesses.11
These patterns are consistent with those predicted by the model. A decline in search
10The U.S. aggregate numbers in Table 2 include a few establishments not in the market-level data we
use below, since the aggregate numbers include establishments in Alaska and Hawaii as well as those not
placed into a speciﬁc county within a state (this latter group is referred to as “statewide” establishments
in the CBP).
11The CBP data does not allow one to track individual establishments through time. It is therefore
conceptually possible that even a growing industry could exhibit net establishment losses at lower employ-
ment ranges due to formerly small businesses growing into larger size categories. However, this scenario
would imply that the total number of establishments in the industry remained roughly unchanged. This
is clearly not the case here. One possibility that cannot be ruled out, however, is that many small es-
tablishments were merged into larger ones. This would shrink establishment counts both at the low end
of the distribution and in total. To the extent mergers played a role, though, we show shortly that the
employment growth among large establishments did not fully make up for employment losses among the
industry’s small operators.
18costs, made possible through the diﬀusion of the internet and the advent and improve-
ment of travel-shopping websites, shifted equilibrium production to the larger, higher-type
producers in the industry. Indeed, some of these high-type producers may host the very
portals that led to the decline of their smaller competitors.
To show the connection more formally, we regress the (logged) number of industry em-
ployees and establishments in a CEA market-year observation on the fraction of people
in the market who reported making purchases online by that year. Because internet use
diﬀused sooner into certain markets with high demand for travel services (e.g., New York
and San Francisco), but for reasons likely unrelated to its use for purchasing those services,
there is an underlying positive correlation across markets in the number of travel agencies
and the fraction of consumers using the internet. If we did not control for these diﬀerences,
we would spuriously conclude that greater internet use led to increases in travel agency
numbers. We therefore include CEA ﬁxed eﬀects in this and all of our empirical speci-
ﬁcations. The estimates thus reﬂect the relationship between changes in online purchase
frequencies and industry activity within CEA markets. We also control for employment
across all industries in the market-year (also taken from the CBP data) to account the
inﬂuence of overall market growth or decline on the industry.
The results, reported in Panel B of Table 2, reﬂect the aggregate patterns above. Higher
fractions of consumers buying goods and services online are associated with declines in the
numbers of industry employees and establishments in the market. The estimated impact
of consumers’ e-commerce activity is quite substantial for the smallest establishments. For
example, a 15 percentage point increase in the fraction of consumers making purchases
online – a one standard deviation change – corresponds to a 13 percent (21 percent) drop
in establishments with 1-4 employees (5-9 employees). Notice, however, that this negative
impact lessens as one works up the establishment size distribution. Indeed, it eventually
becomes insigniﬁcant with positive point estimates for establishments with 50-99 employees
and those with 100 employees or more.12
12The diﬀerent sample sizes across establishment size categories reﬂect the fact that not all market-
year observations have a positive number of establishments in a particular category. The small number
of large establishments in the industry makes the sample for the largest size categories particularly small
and may in part explain the imprecise results in these cases. To explore this issue further, we estimated
an alternative speciﬁcation for the 50-99 and 100+ employee size categories where, rather than using the
logged number of establishments as the dependent variable, we used a dummy equal to one if there was at
least one establishment in the size category in a market-year and zero otherwise. (The numbers in Table 1
indicate most of the observations where this dummy equalled one correspond to the presence of only one
19Greater e-commerce activity among consumers is therefore associated with losses among
the smallest industry producers, but a positive inﬂuence on the largest producers. Despite
the inclusion of market ﬁxed eﬀects, however, the test above does not answer the question
of whether the market structure impact of the shift to e-commerce acts locally or instead
more broadly. It could be that the many within-market changes reﬂect aggregate shifts,
and while the overall increase in internet purchasing behavior shifts industry market shares
in the direction predicted by the model, there is no sense in which this impact is noticeably
stronger in markets that saw larger increases in consumers’ internet use than in those that
experienced smaller gains. To answer the question of the geographic scope of e-commerce’s
impact in the industry, we add a set of year dummies to the regression. This removes
the impact of aggregate shifts in internet use, leaving only the idiosyncratic within-market
variation in the growth of online purchasing patterns and establishment counts to identify
the coeﬃcient. In essence, this regression tests if markets that had unusually high increases
in internet use also saw larger-than-average declines in small-establishment counts.13
The regression results (with year dummy coeﬃcients not reported for parsimony) are
in Table 2, Panel C. In this case all coeﬃcients on the measure of consumers’ e-commerce
activity are statistically insigniﬁcant. There is no measurable market-speciﬁc inﬂuence of
online purchases on local travel agencies. This indicates, very interestingly, that the shifts
in industry market structure seen above, while coincident with consumers’ increasing use of
online sites to conduct their travel purchases, did not arise from a set of coordinated market
structure shifts in speciﬁc markets that produced the observed patterns once aggregated up.
Instead, the inﬂuence of internet use on market structure in the industry is a completely
establishment.) In this case, all market-year observations can be included in the sample. This alternative
speciﬁcation also indicated a positive correlation between consumers using online commerce channels and
growth among large establishments, but in this case the relationship was statistically stronger (signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level for establishments with 50-99 employees and at the 5 percent level for those with
more than 100.) The results in the ﬁrst numerical column indicate that any employment gains in the
larger size classes are swamped by employment losses due to the exit of smaller operations. Overall market
employment, not shown here, enters positively and signiﬁcantly in most of the speciﬁcations, as one might
expect.
13Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient on the fraction of consumers in the market shopping online is identiﬁed oﬀ
of the correlation between two values: a market’s growth rate in the number of industry establishments
relative to the average across all markets in that year, and that same market’s change in the fraction
of consumers reporting shopping online relative to the across-market average. That is, the coeﬃcient
is negative if markets with larger-than-average declines in establishment counts saw higher-than average
growth in internet purchases.
20aggregate phenomenon.
A consideration of the speciﬁc way e-commerce impacted this industry oﬀers a likely
explanation for this result. As internet purchases of airline tickets became more common
over our observation period, airlines incrementally decreased the commissions they paid
to travel agents. The ﬁrst, modest commission cut (imposing a $50 cap per domestic
ticket, which given the standard 10 percent rate at the time meant it was only binding
for tickets above $500) occurred in 1995.14 This ended up being only the ﬁrst cut of a
series, however. By 2002, major carriers had ceased paying commissions altogether. Since
airline tickets accounted for an estimated 58 percent of travel agencies’ revenues in 1996,
these commission declines resulted in a serious income loss for the industry (some lost
commissions were replaced by fees charged directly to the consumer, though these did not
cover the losses). Small operations, having high ﬁxed costs relative to their sales volume,
found proﬁtability increasingly diﬃcult to obtain and began to exit, as seen in the data.
Importantly, however, airlines cut commissions across-the-board nationwide – presumably
in response to perceived changes in consumers’ aggregate ticket purchasing patterns – rather
than market-by-market. We are aware of no instances where airlines selectively reduced
commissions more in those particular markets where online purchases were growing fastest.
This would explain why the connection between internet use and market structure changes
is starkly evident in aggregate changes over time but not so across markets within a period.
It is also consistent with the fact that any growth among the largest establishments was
uncorrelated with local internet use, because many of these establishments plausibly tapped
into the new (and national) internet market, and drew their business growth largely from
customers outside their local area.
5.2 Bookstores
Another line of business that has by many accounts in the popular press been aﬀected
by the diﬀusion of internet commerce is the retail bookstore industry. Several booksellers
have blamed their demise in large part on the competitive demands of e-commerce (see,
for example, Herman 2001, Weisman 2004, and Melo 2005). The process through which
14The facts on travel agent commissions discussed in this paragraph are from a 2002 report by the
National Commission to Ensure Consumer Information and Choice in the Airline Industry (NCECICAI).
The creation of the NCECICAI was a provision of the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century. The commission’s congressionally mandated mission was to study the travel agent industry and,
more generally, the airline services information available to consumers.
21this competitive eﬀect would take place is again that which is highlighted in our model:
e-commerce induced reductions in consumers’ search costs shift market share across the
industry type distribution.
We investigate this possibility by repeating the empirical analyses above, this time
using CBP data for the bookstores (SIC 5942/NAICS 451211) industry. We begin with
the industry-wide establishment counts shown in Panel A of Table 3. They reﬂect similar
patterns to those seen with the travel agency aggregates: declines in establishments in the
smaller employment size categories with coincident expansion in the larger categories. For
instance, while the number of bookstores with fewer than 20 employees fell by over one-
fourth during the sample, those with more than 20 employees more than doubled. This
growth was particularly pronounced among the 50-99 employee size category. So we again
see the pattern of market share shifts from small (low-type) operations to large (high-type)
ones.
Again the question arises of whether these eﬀects reﬂect aggregate impacts or instead
coincide with local internet commerce patterns. No obvious analogy exists in the book-
stores industry to the airlines’ commission reductions and their impact on travel agencies.
Therefore one might expect the impact of the internet here to be more concentrated within
particular markets. If this is the case, the overall shift from smaller to larger bookstores
noted above reﬂects aggregated changes that occurred market-by-market.
We investigate this issue by estimating the above speciﬁcation that includes year ﬁxed
eﬀects, this time using bookstores CBP data. The results are reported in Panel B of Table
3. Again we have suppressed the estimated year eﬀects and the coeﬃcients on overall
market employment.
In contrast to the market structure shifts in the travel agency industry, there is more
evidence that local market eﬀects matter in bookstores. Markets seeing faster growth in
local consumers making online purchases had greater declines in bookstore employment
and the total number of bookstores, with establishment exit being driven by losses among
operations having fewer than 20 employees. This increased exit was statistically signiﬁcant,
except for establishments with less than ﬁve employees.
There is weaker evidence, on the other hand, that local online purchasing behavior
impacted the growth seen among larger booksellers. None of the e-commerce activity
(“fraction online”) coeﬃcients for the three largest size categories, while reﬂecting the
positive comovement between online shopping and the numbers of larger bookstores, are
statistically signiﬁcant. This is likely due to the fact that the industry classiﬁcation sys-
22tem includes an industry separate from bookstores, ”Electronic Shopping and Mail-Order
Houses” (NAICS 45411), into which the largest online booksellers are classiﬁed.15 The
expansion seen in large bookstores may instead reﬂect the ascendance of the new-format
large-store chains like Barnes and Noble and Borders. Their growth is not strongly corre-
lated with local online shopping habits because, while these sellers have extensive online
operations (Barnes and Noble has its own website and Borders has teamed with Amazon),
their online operations have industrial classiﬁcations that are separate in the CBP data
from their brick-and-mortar locations.
5.3 New Auto Dealers
The last industry in which we investigate the impact of e-commerce on diﬀerent producer
types is new auto dealers. The new auto dealers industry has special appeal as a forum
for testing our model. Speciﬁcally, franchise law restrictions make it extremely diﬃcult to
operate internet-only sales channels.16
This means that e-commerce in this industry functions in a way that almost exactly
matches how we embody it in the model; i.e., it is purely a demand-side device that lowers
consumers’ costs of gathering product information. The essential technology of production
and delivery in the industry is unchanged, even among any new producers that might enter
the market after the change in search costs. There are no issues of retailers selling the
industry’s product but not being counted in the industry’s CBP data (as with Amazon or
WalMart with regard to the bookstores industry, for instance), and consumers cannot use
e-commerce channels to bypass retailers altogether and buy from manufacturers directly
(as is the case for many airline ticket purchases). Thus new car dealers allow us to see
quite directly how reductions in search costs impact an essentially isolated set of retailers
whose basic distribution technology is not impacted by e-commerce. The only change they
15Note that online airline ticket sales operations are not included in this industry. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, businesses in NAICS 45411 sold $4.16 billion of books and magazines in 2003, $2.14 billion
of which was exchanged via ”e-commerce” channels (these are deﬁned as transactions over open networks
like the internet or proprietary networks running systems like Electronic Data Interchange). These book
and magazine sales accounted for 3.2 percent and 5.3 percent of the industry’s total and e-commerce
product sales, respectively. See U.S. Census Bureau (2005) for details.
16See, for example, Katz and Payne (2000) and Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001). Auto
manufacturers are prohibited from selling their cars directly. Even online buying services like autobytel.com
and carsdirect.com do not sell their own inventories of cars to their customers. Instead, they act as referral
services, matching customers to their aﬃliated physical dealers.
23face is in how easy it is for consumers to ﬁnd out about their products or to be matched
to low-price dealerships.
There is anecdotal evidence that e-commerce channels have increased the number of
dealers from whom they obtain quotes before purchasing (Gartner 2004). Furthermore,
Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso examine in a set of papers the relationship
between buyers’ use of e-commerce channels and the (lower) ﬁnal prices they pay for their
cars.17 However, we are unaware of any attempt to formally analyze what this reduction
in search costs leads to in terms of the market structure of auto dealerships. The model
oﬀers guidance as to the likely mechanism and its impact; namely, that declining search
costs led to shrinking and exit among the low-type dealers and shifted market share to the
highest-type operations.
Panel A of Table 4 shows changes in the number of new auto dealer establishments
by size over the sample period. Unlike travel agencies and bookstores, total number of
establishments did not decline. In fact, the number rose slightly. Some of this gain came
from growth in the number of establishments with less than ten employees. It is not clear
what types of operations these are, particularly those with 1-4 employees, which is quite
small even for “standard” dealerships in isolated rural settings.
Excepting these, however, the remainder of the establishment size types exhibit the
patterns seen before. (Note also from panel C of Table 1 that, unlike travel agencies and
bookstores, the bulk of the industry’s establishments are not concentrated in the smallest
employment categories. Over two-thirds have between 10 and 100 employees.) There
were drops in the number of dealerships in the 10-19 and 20-49 employee categories –
just under 20 percent in the former case and 10 percent in the latter – but growth in the
number of larger-sized establishments. Moreover, the growth rate in the establishment
counts increases with the size category. (Because the number of auto dealers with 100-249
employees is so much larger than in the travel agency and bookstores industry, we have
included this as a separate category in our analysis here and aggregated establishments
with 250 or more employees together.)
The regression results are shown in panel B of Table 4. Again only the speciﬁcation
with year ﬁxed eﬀects is shown. The changes in the aggregate establishment counts just
17Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) show that car shoppers using Autobytel.com to get
free quotes from dealers in their market end up paying lower prices. Zettelmeyer, Morton, and Silva-Risso
(2005) provide evidence that the lower prices obtained by consumers utilizing online resources is not solely
due to a selection bias in which hard-bargaining or low-search-cost customers choose to use the Internet.
24discussed are in fact related to local consumers’ use of the internet to make purchases. While
the coeﬃcients on fraction online are insigniﬁcant for the three smallest establishment size
categories, there is a signiﬁcant negative impact of local online purchasing on the number of
dealerships with 20-49 employees in the market. Its economic size strikes us as nontrivial; a
one-standard-deviation increase in online shopping corresponds to a 3.5 percent drop in the
establishment count. At the same time, increasing e-commerce activity drives growth in
the number of local dealerships with 50 or more employees. The result is not signiﬁcant for
the largest establishment size category (though the coeﬃcient is large and positive), likely
due to the small number of market-years in our sample with very large dealerships. If we
estimate as above an alternative speciﬁcation using an indicator for market-years where
at least one such establishment exists, however, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive impact of
e-commerce on the presence of very large auto dealers.
Interestingly, the ﬁrst two columns of panel B suggest that e-commerce has had an
expansionary eﬀect on the industry overall. Markets where internet purchasing grew more
than average saw higher increases in auto dealer establishment counts and employment
(recall that this is controlling for overall employment changes in the market). This is of
course opposite what is seen in the travel agency and bookstores industries. This likely
reﬂects the fact discussed above that e-commerce did not facilitate growth in new auto
sales through channels external to the industry, unlike what happened for travel agents
and booksellers. Thus here, industry producers overall were able to beneﬁt from market
expansions driven by reductions in consumers’ search costs, rather than losing part or all
of the expanded market to sellers outside the industry.
6 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the equilibrium market structure changes spurred by the in-
troduction of e-commerce tools that reduce consumers’ search costs. We speciﬁed a gen-
eral industry model involving consumers with diﬀering search costs buying products from
heterogeneous-type producers. Solving for the equilibrium in the general case, we showed
how shifts in the consumer search cost distribution impact equilibrium prices and market
shares. Speciﬁcally, downward shifts in search costs lead to lower prices and shift market
share from low-type producers to the industry’s high-type businesses.
While there is an empirical literature investigating the advent and diﬀusion of e-commerce
on prices, little has been done regarding the market structure impacts – speciﬁcally, the
25shifts in market share from low- to high-type businesses that our model predicts. We test
these predictions in three industries for which the introduction of e-commerce has arguably
decreased consumers’ search costs considerably: travel agencies, bookstores, and new auto
dealers.
We found evidence of the market share shifts predicted by the model. As consumers’
use of the internet to make purchases rose, smaller establishments (where size reﬂects ﬁrm
“type”) declined in number and larger establishments became more dominant.
Interestingly, while the nature of the market share reallocations were similar in the
industries, the speciﬁc mechanisms through which the declining search costs created them
were diﬀerent. For travel agencies, the shifts reﬂected aggregate changes, common across
markets, driven in large part by airlines’ reductions in agent commissions in response
to consumers’ increasing use of online sources to buy tickets. This is evidenced by the
fact that once these aggregate changes in internet purchasing patterns were controlled for,
there was no indication that the magnitude of the market share changes were any larger
(smaller) in markets experiencing idiosyncratically high (low) growth in consumers’ online
purchases. For bookstores and auto dealers, on the other hand, there was evidence that
more exit occurred among smaller stores in those markets where internet use grew fastest.
This suggests that the industry-wide declines in small bookstores and auto dealers reﬂect
market-speciﬁc impacts.
7 Appendix
7.1 Rationale for Uniform Search Costs
Since we know (from Proposition 1) that the best-response price function p(c,F,t) is in-
creasing in t for all F and c, a natural suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium price function
p∗ and equilibrium distribution F ∗ to be increasing in t is that the market be supermod-
ular in the sense of Rauh (2008). That is, we look for conditions under which each ﬁrm’s
proﬁt function has increasing diﬀerences in own price p and market price distribution F.
If this is the case, the best-response function p(c,F,t) is increasing in F. Since p(c,F,t)
is also increasing in t, this implies that the equilibrium price function p∗(c,t) is increasing
in t for all c. Intuitively, the increase of t has two eﬀects on the price function of a given
ﬁrm: ﬁrst, the direct eﬀect, holding the price distribution constant (which is positive by
Proposition 1) and, second, the indirect eﬀect due to the increase in the prices of other
26ﬁrms (which is positive by supermodularity). While the condition of supermodularity is
not strictly necessary for the equilibrium price function to be increasing in t, intuition
suggests that an unambiguous general comparative statics result for p∗ with respect to t
is unlikely to obtain when the eﬀect of the market price on the best-response individual
pricing function is ambiguous, which will typically be the case when the market exhibits
no complementarities.
We now turn to Rauh (2008) for a general insight into the class of search cost distribu-
tions that result in a supermodular search market. Before we do so, we must note, however,
that the class of models considered in Rauh (2008) diﬀers from ours in two fundamental
ways: ﬁrst, our model contains an endogenous probability of ﬁrms quitting the market af-
ter realizing that their marginal cost exceeds the threshold ¯ c, which is absent from Rauh’s
model, and, second, the total mass of ﬁrms L is endogenously determined in our model,
but is ﬁxed at an exogenous level in Rauh’s. These additional features make our model
more complicated than Rauh’s, yet the same basic forces are at play in determining the
interaction between own price p and market price F. In particular, the nature of the added
complexity suggests that the cases for which supermodularity can be guaranteed in our
model is a subset of those that yield supermodularity in Rauh’s model.
Unfortunately, it turns out that this observation forces us to restrict our attention to
the uniform distribution of search costs. The reason for this conclusion is as follows. First,
note that if the search cost density is increasing sharply over its range, a rightward shift of
the distribution (i.e., an increase of search costs) decreases the advantage of low-cost ﬁrms,
because they now need to share more of their customer base with more high-cost ﬁrms.
Thus, in his Proposition 3, Rauh shows that the search cost density must not be increasing
too sharply, lest an increase in the search costs should actually decrease the demand faced
by low-cost ﬁrms. Second, note that if the search cost density is decreasing sharply over its
range, an increase in search costs increases the mass of marginal consumers (i.e., consumers
indiﬀerent between buying and not buying) at a range of prices, consequently decreasing
incentives to raise prices. This observation is at the heart of Rauh’s Proposition 5, which
gives an upper bound on the rate of decrease in the search cost density. Propositions 3 and 5
together show that supermodularity cannot be guaranteed unless the search cost is neither
increasing nor decreasing too sharply. To quote Rauh (p. 15): “The uniform distribution
therefore represents the canonical example of complementarities.” Furthermore, the bounds
that Rauh’s Propositions 3 and 5 place on the absolute value of the slope of the search cost
density reduce to zero when there is no set price cap, beyond which consumers always have
27zero demand. Thus, with inﬁnitely inelastic unit demand, as in our model, complementarity
in the baseline model of Rauh (2008) can be ensured only if the search cost distribution is
uniform. This leads us to restrict our attention to the uniform distribution.
7.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1








Diﬀerentiating with respect to p∗ yields (omitting the arguments for visual clarity):






























∂t > 0 iﬀ ψt < 0.




























0 F(u)du for all r > p∗, the MLRP implies that the integrand is
increasing in t for each r. Consequently, the entire expression is decreasing in t, and thus
also ψt < 0. But this implies
∂p∗
∂t > 0, as noted above.
Proof of Lemma 1
Implicitly diﬀerentiating the two identities that deﬁne a search equilibrium, (18) and (19),


















where the subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Denoting
I ≡













2Γ(¯ c)2 , (23)





I − 1; Ψ¯ ρ =
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I > 0. (24)













Plugging this into (23) yields I < 1/2, which immediately implies that Ψ¯ ρ > 0. Notice
also that, since the integral in (18) is positive, (18) implies that
√




a < 1 and therefore that Ψa < I − 1 < 0. Consequently, equation (21)







If both L and ¯ ρ were non-increasing in a, the left-hand side of (21) would be negative,
which would contradict (21).
Proof of Lemma 2
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Φa < 0. (28)







If this were not true, the left-hand side of (22) would be negative, which would contra-
dict (22).































29that is, aL is increasing in a, and thus δ = 1/(aL) is decreasing in a.
Proof of Lemma 4
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￿
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Thus, for any c ≤ ¯ c < ¯ ρ(a), the sign of πa(¯ c(a),a) equals the sign of the rightmost term
above. Since δ′(a) < 0 by Lemma 3, this term is increasing in c. It follows that if the term
is negative for c0, it is, a fortiori, negative for all c < c0.
Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by showing that the proﬁt of the ﬁrm at the current marginal cost cutoﬀ level
¯ c(a) must decrease as search costs decrease. First, rewrite the entry condition (19) as
Z ¯ c(a)
0
π(c;a)γ(c)dc − Γ(¯ c(a))ν = a.
Fully diﬀerentiating this with respect to a and noting that π(¯ c(a);a) = ν, yields
Z ¯ c(a)
0
πa(c;a)γ(c)dc = 0. (32)
Together with Lemma 4, this implies that πa(¯ c(a);a) > 0: otherwise, the integrand in (32)
would be everywhere negative (by Lemma 4), which would contradict (32).
It is now obvious that the marginal cost threshold ¯ c(a) decreases as a decreases. Let a
change from a1 to a2 < a1. Then
π(¯ c(a2),a2) = ν = π(¯ c(a1),a1) > π(¯ c(a1),a2),
where both equalities follow from the deﬁnition of ¯ c(a), and the inequality follows from
πa(¯ c(a);a) > 0. Since πc(c,a) < 0 for all a and c by Property 3, this implies that ¯ c(a1) >
¯ c(a2), as desired.
Proof of Corollary 1
Let a change from a0 to a1 < a0. Let us index all corresponding quantities and func-
tions by 0 and 1, respectively. By Proposition 3, ¯ c1 < ¯ c0. The cdf of the marginal-cost
distribution of operating ﬁrms is given by ˜ Γ(c) = Γ(c)/Γ(¯ c). Since c1 < c0, it immediately
follows that ˜ Γ1(c) > ˜ Γ0(c) for all c.
Next, observe that p1(0) < p0(0) (by Proposition 2) and that p1(¯ c1) < p1(¯ c0) < p0(¯ c0)
(the ﬁrst inequality by Property 2 and ¯ c1 < ¯ c0; the second by Proposition 2). Thus, the sup-
port of the equilibrium price distribution shifts down, p
1 < p
0 and ¯ p1 < ¯ p0. Consequently,
30F1(p) ≥ F0(p) on the complement of [p
0, ¯ p1], since F0(p) = 0 for p < p
0 and F1(p) = 1 for
p > ¯ p1.
Finally, by Proposition 2, p1(c) < p0(c) for all c ∈ [0,c1], so that p
−1
1 (r) > p
−1
0 (r) for all
r ∈ [p
0, ¯ p1]. Since ¯ c1 < ¯ c0, it follows from the deﬁnition of F ((12)) that F1(p) > F0(p) for
all p ∈ [p
0,p
1].
Proof of Corollary 2




This would be violated if πa(c;a) > 0 for all c < ¯ c. Thus, there exists ˆ c < ¯ c such that
πa(ˆ c;a) ≤ 0. But then, by Lemma 4, πa(c;a) < 0 for all c < ˆ c.
Proof of Corollary 3 The total market share of all operating ﬁrms equals one: 1 =
R ¯ c(a)
0 X(c,a)dc. Diﬀerentiating this with respect to a yields





Since c′(a) > 0 by Proposition 3, this implies that
R ¯ c(a)
0 Xa(c,a) < 0. In particular, there
exists ˆ c < ¯ c such that Xa(ˆ c,a) < 0.
By deﬁnition,
X(c,a) = Lx(c;a)γ(c) =
1
2a













The sign of this expression equals the sign of the expression in parentheses, which is clearly
increasing in c. Thus, Xa(ˆ c;a) < 0 implies that Xa(c;a) < 0 for all c < ˆ c.
7.3 Conditions for Increasing L
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0 (¯ ρ − c)γ(c)dc
,
where I is as deﬁned in(23). Noting that I < 1






















0 (¯ ρ − c)γ(c)dc
.
Integrating both the numerator and the denominator in the fraction on the right-hand side




























Since the left-hand expression is greater than or equal to 2 and the ﬁrst summand on the
right-hand side is less than or equal to 1, a suﬃcient condition for ∂L












Even though numerical simulations suggest that this condition does hold for most, if not
all, distributions Γ, there does not appear an analytically tractable way of showing this or
any other condition leading to (33).
7.4 Numerical Simulations
Closed-form solutions for equilibrium components such as the price distribution, the marginal
cost cutoﬀ, and the mass of ﬁrms do not exist even in the case when the search cost distri-
bution is uniform. When search costs are not uniformly distributed, algebraic means are
even less successful: not only are there no closed form solutions, but also, as explained in
Appendix 7.1, it is in general very hard even to derive comparative statics results. We there-
fore turn to numerical simulations in this section. The goal is twofold: ﬁrst, to illustrate the
known comparative statics results for the uniform distribution, and, second, to determine
whether similar results can be obtained for another class of distributions. These latter
investigations show that comparative results analogous to those from the uniform search
cost distribution case do obtain when search costs follow an exponential distribution.
32Since the equilibrium is straightforwardly deﬁned by a system of equations ((2), (6),
(8), (10), (11), and (12)), there is no need for an ad-hoc numerical algorithm. We simply
discretize the search cost, marginal cost, and price spaces and solve the resulting system
of nonlinear equations using the mathematical modeling language AMPL with the solvers
SNOPT and MINOS.
7.4.1 Uniform Search Cost Distribution
Let the search cost distribution be uniform on [0,a]. The results derived in the theoretical
section then show that the marginal cost threshold ¯ c should be increasing in a and that
equilibrium price distributions should shift to the right as a increases. Consequently, the
expected price µp =
R p(¯ c)
0 pf(p)dp should also be increasing in a. The theoretical analysis
remains silent about the direction of change in the mass of ﬁrms L. Using three diﬀerent
distributions for the marginal cost distribution, we conﬁrm the theoretical results for ¯ c, F,
and µp. Furthermore, for all of the cases studied we also observe that the mass of ﬁrms, L,
increases in a.
The changes of ¯ c, µp, and L with respect to a are shown in Figure 1. Equilibrium price






















.5 1 1.5 2
a























.5 1 1.5 2
a


























.5 1 1.5 2
a
Uniform(0,1) MC Exponential(1) MC
Beta(2,1) MC
Figure 1: Comparative statics with respect to search cost increases when search costs are
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Marginal cost distribution: Beta(2,1)
Figure 2: Equilibrium price distributions for three levels of uniform search costs (a) under
three types of marginal cost distribution
357.4.2 Exponential Search Cost Distribution
Let the search cost distribution have an exponential distribution with parameter λ = −a >
0. Then, higher a corresponds to higher search costs (in the sense of MLRP). Using three
diﬀerent distributions for the marginal cost distribution, we ﬁnd that the local comparative
statics are analogous to those obtained for uniform search cost distributions. In particular,
¯ c, F, µp, and L are all increasing in a.
The changes of ¯ c, µp, and L with respect to a are shown in Figure 3. Equilibrium price
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Figure 3: Comparative statics with respect to search cost increases when search costs are
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Figure 4: Equilibrium price distributions for three levels of exponential search costs (a)
under three types of marginal cost distribution
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 Mean  25%ile  Median  75%ile 
Total establishments  74.3  10.8  22.4  58.3 
Estabs w/ 1‐4 employees  48.4  6.6  13.6  35.7 
Estabs w/ 5‐9 employees  16.8  3  6  13.7 
Estabs w/ 10‐19 employees  5.9  0.7  1.9  4.5 
Estabs w/ 20‐49 employees  2.3  0  0.6  1.8 
Estabs w/ 50‐99 employees  0.6  0  0  0.4 





  Mean  25%ile  Median  75%ile 
Total establishments  35.4  9.8  17.8  36.6 
Estabs w/ 1‐4 employees  15.3  4.3  8.3  17.8 
Estabs w/ 5‐9 employees  9.9  2.8  5  10.5 
Estabs w/ 10‐19 employees  6.0  1.4  2.8  6.2 
Estabs w/ 20‐49 employees  3.1  0.6  1.4  3.5 
Estabs w/ 50‐99 employees  1.0  0  0.3  1.1 





  Mean  25%ile  Median  75%ile 
Total establishments  73.5  24.8  41.7  82 
Estabs w/ 1‐4 employees  11.3  3.2  5.8  12.1 
Estabs w/ 5‐9 employees  5.2  1.7  3.3  6.7 
Estabs w/ 10‐19 employees  10.5  3.6  7.2  13.5 
Estabs w/ 20‐49 employees  24.8  9  15.5  28.3 
Estabs w/ 50‐99 employees  15.4  3.9  7.4  16.3 
Estabs w/ 100‐249 employees  6  0.4  1.9  5.6 







Year  Total  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100+ 
1994  28,118  18,186  6,774  2,121  759  169  109 
1995  28,099  18,089  6,710  2,212  802  176  110 
1996  28,735  18,654  6,724  2,181  859  200  117 
1997  29,452  19,183  6,758  2,332  834  206  139 
1998  28,776  18,460  6,755  2,325  861  212  163 
1999  27,390  17,611  6,281  2,276  821  225  176 
2000  25,975  16,783  5,836  2,091  845  234  186 
2001  24,654  16,050  5,306  2,000  853  243  202 
2002  21,079  14,281  4,151  1,581  681  201  184 








estabs.)  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100+ 
N  3449  3449  3426  3306  2548  1740  783  538 



























estabs.)  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100+ 
N  3449  3449  3426  3306  2548  1740  783  538 






























Year  Total  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100+ 
1994  13,520  6,625  3,840  2,198  708  102  47 
1995  13,403  6,234  3,985  2,165  806  154  59 
1996  13,134  5,916  4,039  1,940  966  211  62 
1997  12,301  5,254  3,753  2,021  933  286  54 
1998  12,151  5,031  3,588  2,025  1,088  357  62 
1999  11,957  4,878  3,467  2,063  1,076  410  63 
2000  11,662  4,641  2,953  2,349  1,163  485  71 
2001  11,559  4,678  3,100  2,023  1,276  411  71 
2002  12,178  5,494  2,777  2,089  1,275  475  68 









estabs.)  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100+ 
N  3448  3448  3386  3338  3031  2400  1275  423 





























Year  Total  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100‐249  250+ 
1994  24,130  2,715  1,724  4,142  9,017  4,853  1,601  78 
1995  24,230  2,850  1,653  3,882  8,927  5,063  1,755  100 
1996  24,639  3,320  1,691  3,735  8,757  5,155  1,866  115 
1997  26,208  3,848  1,941  3,825  9,065  5,376  2,022  131 
1998  26,216  4,117  1,971  3,777  8,873  5,421  1,931  126 
1999  26,117  4,287  1,948  3,611  8,616  5,437  2,083  135 
2000  26,225  4,440  1,841  3,505  8,380  5,592  2,303  164 
2001  26,444  4,759  1,863  3,462  8,373  5,493  2,332  162 
2002  25,625  4,176  1,723  3,282  8,202  5,600  2,451  191 









estabs.)  1‐4  5‐9  10‐19  20‐49  50‐99  100‐249  250+ 
N  3423  3425  3300  3021  3311  3423  3363  2455  643 
R2  0.99  0.99  0.88  0.82  0.91  0.95  0.95  0.94  0.80 
Fraction 
Online 
0.155* 
(0.054) 
0.130* 
(0.042) 
0.200 
(0.187) 
‐0.081 
(0.215) 
‐0.063 
(0.146) 
‐0.231* 
(0.091) 
0.230* 
(0.117) 
0.595* 
(0.175) 
0.530 
(0.602) 
 
Notes: All regression specifications include CEA market fixed effects and control for (logged) overall 
employment in the market‐year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk denotes 
significance at the five percent level. 
 
 